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ENGENDERING FAIRNESS IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
ARRESTS: IMPROVING POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY 
THROUGH THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE 
ABSTRACT 
When police decline to respond to reported violations of restraining orders, 
victims of gender-based violence and their children suffer tragic consequences.  
Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to remedy problems of this sort by lifting 
the shield of immunity when a state actor violates an individual’s 
constitutional rights.  A credible threat of liability for police officers is 
imperative to encourage police to act in a way that protects individuals from 
harm.  However, the Supreme Court has substantially limited the possible 
§ 1983-based causes of action a victim of gender-based violence can bring 
against a police officer.  The only remaining avenue for liability is an equal 
protection claim.  However, equal protection challenges have met such 
consistent rejection in the lower federal courts that many scholars believe they 
are not a tenable strategy for police accountability. 
This Comment develops an equal protection claim distinct from those that 
have failed in lower courts.  Rather than relying on disparate impact-based 
arguments, this Comment formulates a new equal protection claim by 
reframing the challenged state action and the basis of classification.  The 
claim challenges an officer’s use of gender stereotypes in responding to 
victims.  This Comment will show that basing a discretionary decision about 
how to respond to a victim on a stereotypical assumption about women is an 
unconstitutional gender classification that fails intermediate scrutiny and 
therefore violates the victim’s right to equal protection. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1999, Jessica Gonzales obtained a domestic violence restraining order1 
protecting herself and her three daughters against her abusive ex-husband, 
Simon Gonzales.2  In the month after she obtained the restraining order, Ms. 
Gonzales called the local Castle Rock police on four or five occasions to report 
serious violations of the order by Mr. Gonzales.3  On none of these occasions 
did the Castle Rock police arrest Mr. Gonzales, despite having probable cause 
to do so.4  A month after the order was issued, Mr. Gonzales kidnapped the 
three girls from the front yard of the family home.5  When Ms. Gonzales 
realized the girls were missing, she immediately called the police department 
because she suspected that Mr. Gonzales had taken them.  Despite Ms. 
Gonzales’s indication to the dispatcher that Mr. Gonzales’s actions were in 
violation of a restraining order, the Castle Rock police took no action in 
response to Ms. Gonzales’s request for help.6  When two police officers were 
dispatched to her home two hours later in response to a second phone call, they 
told her they could not do anything, despite the restraining order, because the 
children were with their father.7 
 
 1 Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 751 (2005).  On May 21, 1999, a Colorado trial court 
issued a temporary restraining order prohibiting Mr. Gonzales from “molest[ing] or disturb[ing] the peace” of 
Ms. Gonzales and their children, ages seven, nine, and ten, and from coming within one hundred yards of the 
family home.  Id.  On June 4, 1999, with both Mr. and Ms. Gonzales present in court, the judge made the order 
permanent as part of their divorce proceedings after modifying it to allow Mr. Gonzales “a midweek dinner 
visit arranged by the parties.”  Id. at 752–53 (quoting Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 366 F.3d 1093 (10th 
Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 2 Brief for Petitioner at 6, Gonzales v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. (2008) 
[hereinafter Gonzales Brief].  Jessica and Simon Gonzales had been married for nine years, during which time 
they had three daughters.  Id.  Since 1996, Mr. Gonzales’s behavior had become increasingly “erratic.”  Id.  
Ms. Gonzales decided to file for divorce in 1999, after Mr. Gonzales attempted to hang himself in the family 
garage and Ms. Gonzales determined that she needed to take steps to protect herself and her children from his 
behavior.  Id. 
 3 Id. at 9. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 753. 
 6 Gonzales Brief, supra note 2, at 10, 11. 
 7 Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 753; Gonzales Brief, supra note 2, at 12. 
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Later that night, Ms. Gonzales reached Mr. Gonzales on his cell phone, and 
he informed her that he had the girls at an amusement park in Denver.8  Again, 
Ms. Gonzales contacted the police.  But the officer with whom she spoke 
refused to send anyone to the amusement park, instead telling her to wait and 
see if Mr. Gonzales returned the girls.9  At midnight, when the children still 
had not returned, Ms. Gonzales drove to Mr. Gonzales’s apartment to see if he 
and the children were there; when she found no one at home, she drove to the 
police station to make an incident report.10  The officer to whom she submitted 
the report “made no reasonable effort to enforce the [restraining order] or 
locate the three children.  Instead, he went to dinner.”11 
At approximately 3:20 a.m., Mr. Gonzales arrived at the police station, 
parked his pick-up truck, and opened fire on the station with a semi-automatic 
handgun that he had purchased earlier that evening.12  The police fired back, 
killing Mr. Gonzales.  Inside his truck, they found the dead bodies of all three 
Gonzales daughters.13 
Although the sad facts of Castle Rock occurred more than ten years ago, 
such cases remain salient because the Supreme Court has held that the federal 
government has no substantive role in regulating and preventing violence 
against women.14  This Comment begins with the premise that the police 
should have done more to enforce Ms. Gonzales’s restraining order.  Failure to 
do so resulted in the death of three of the four individuals protected by a court-
 
 8 Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 753. 
 9 Id.  According to Ms. Gonzales, the officer refused to send someone to the amusement park because it 
was outside of the Castle Rock Police Department’s jurisdiction, and refused to put out an all points bulletin—
an electronic dissemination of information about a wanted person—because it would “needlessly go statewide 
and would cost the state money.”  Gonzales Brief, supra note 2, at 14. 
 10 Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 753. 
 11 Id. at 754 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. 
 14 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 598–99 (2000).  In Morrison, the Court struck down a 
provision of the Violence Against Women Act, which created a federal cause of action allowing victims of 
gender-based violence to sue their perpetrators in federal court, as an unconstitutional exercise of 
congressional power under both the Commerce Clause and section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id.  The 
Court held that such a remedy encroached too far upon states’ rights despite extensive congressional findings 
that gender-based violence affects interstate commerce and that pervasive bias in state justice systems against 
victims of gender-motivated violence was resulting in systematic underprosecution of gender-based violence 
crimes.  Id.  The attorneys general of thirty-six states had endorsed this remedy provision as “a particularly 
appropriate remedy for the harm caused by gender-motivated violence” in light of the “States’ own studies 
demonstrat[ing] that their efforts to combat gender-motivated violence, while substantial, are not sufficient by 
themselves.”  Brief of the State of Arizona et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Nos. 99-5, 99-29). 
JAIN GALLEYSFINAL 6/28/2011  8:36 AM 
2011] ENGENDERING FAIRNESS IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ARRESTS 1015 
issued order of protection and significant emotional trauma to the fourth.  One 
way to encourage the enforcement of restraining orders is to present police 
with a credible threat of liability if they fail to do so.  This Comment develops 
a new litigation strategy under § 1983 for victims who are harmed by, and wish 
to hold police accountable for, police failure to enforce their restraining orders.  
Part I of this Comment describes the present state of police unaccountability, 
including the Supreme Court’s rejection of both substantive and procedural 
due process theories for police liability under § 1983.  Part II analyzes the 
failure of equal protection-based § 1983 challenges in lower courts.  Part III 
presents an equal protection argument distinct from those that lower courts 
have thus far heard and rejected.  This claim argues that police may no longer 
use gender stereotypes when responding to violations of restraining orders 
because this use violates a victim’s rights to equal protection of the law. 
I. POLICE (UN)ACCOUNTABILITY TODAY: A SAD STATE OF AFFAIRS 
Police accountability to survivors of gender-based violence,15 particularly 
with regard to the enforcement of restraining orders,16 is at a shockingly low 
level today.  This unaccountability is the result of layers of immunity and 
judicial reluctance to infringe on that immunity.  Section A provides 
background information regarding restraining orders for gender-based violence 
situations.  Section B further discusses the historical and continuing obstacles 
to police accountability in this area due to immunity, while section C reviews 
past attempts to overcome immunity and explains the reasons these attempts 
have failed.  Finally, section D explains why police enforcement of restraining 
orders is necessary to protect gender-based violence victims, illustrating the 
need for police liability. 
A. Historical Background and Restraining Orders Today 
The facts of the Castle Rock case are egregious but sadly common.  
Nationally, there is a consistent lack of police enforcement of restraining 
 
 15 This Comment uses the terms domestic violence and gender-based violence interchangeably.  Many 
feminist scholars prefer the term gender-based violence because it is more inclusive and attempts to remove 
the idea that gender-based violence is simply a “domestic” problem not worthy of legal or community 
attention.  However, both terms are widely used in legal scholarship and in litigation documents. 
 16 This Comment will also use the terms restraining order, protective order, and order of protection 
interchangeably.  State statutes generally refer to such court-issued orders using one of these terms, and the 
differences between them is not relevant to the issues presented here. 
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orders for gender-based violence victims.17  Sixty percent of restraining orders 
are violated within one year, and twenty-nine percent of these violations 
involve severe violence.18  Any violation of a restraining order is an offense for 
which the restrained party may be arrested.19  However, only forty-four percent 
of violations result in arrest,20 and some studies have found the arrest rate to be 
as low as twenty percent.21 
Historically, police indifference to pleas for help from domestic violence 
victims stemmed from the notion that domestic violence was a private or 
family matter in which police should not interfere, despite victims’ requests for 
help.22  Indeed, well into the 1960s, many police training manuals instructed 
officers to help resolve disputes rather than protect victims, and encouraged 
officers to avoid making arrests in marital and family violence situations by 
giving parties time to cool down or encouraging batterers to take a walk around 
the block.23 
Since the battered women’s movement of the 1960s and ’70s, all fifty 
states24 have enacted legislation criminalizing domestic violence and allowing 
judges to issue civil restraining orders25 to protect gender-based violence 
survivors and their children when there is a risk that the abuser will inflict 
physical harm on his or her partner.26  Unfortunately, these protective measures 
 
 17 Peter Finn & Sarah Colson, Civil Protection Orders: Legislation, Current Court Practice, and 
Enforcement, in LEGAL INTERVENTIONS IN FAMILY VIOLENCE 43, 43 (1998) (noting that one major limitation 
of civil protection orders is their “[w]idespread lack of enforcement, even though such orders allow for 
expansion of police arrest powers and increase the ability of police to monitor repeat offenders”). 
 18 NAT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, FACT SHEET: ORDERS OF PROTECTION 2 (2005), available at 
http://www.ncvc.org/ncvc/AGP.Net/Components/documentViewer/Download.aspxnz?DocumentID=39669. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Robert J. Kane, Police Responses to Restraining Orders in Domestic Violence Incidents: Identifying 
the Custody-Threshold Thesis, 27 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 561, 563 (2000). 
 22 G. Kristian Miccio, If Not Now, When? Individual and Collective Responsibility for Male Intimate 
Violence, 15 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 405, 434 (2009). 
 23 Deborah L. Rhode, Social Research and Social Change: Meeting the Challenge of Gender Inequality 
and Sexual Abuse, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 11, 17–18 (2007). 
 24 Am. Bar Ass’n Comm’n on Domestic Violence, Domestic Violence Civil Protection Orders (CPOs) by 
State, AM. BAR ASS’N (June 2007), http://www.abanet.org/domviol/docs/DVCPOChartJune07.pdf. 
 25 NAT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, LEGAL SER. BULLETIN NO. 4, ENFORCEMENT OF PROTECTIVE 
ORDERS 1 (2002), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/ovc_archives/bulletins/legalseries/bulletin4/ncj189190. 
pdf.  The consequences of violating an order of protection vary by jurisdiction; they often include arrest and 
charges of civil or criminal contempt, misdemeanor, or even felony.  Id. at 1–2. 
 26 See EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 
235 (3d ed. 2003). 
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have done little to help many victims of abuse because of police apathy and 
resistance in responding to calls for help. 
In response to this continuing police indifference, many states have taken 
steps to eliminate police discretion in situations of gender-based violence.  
Thirty-two states have enacted statutory “mandatory arrest” provisions when 
an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has violated a 
restraining order.27  Colorado, where the Gonzales tragedy occurred, is one of 
these states; the Colorado statute28 instructs officers that they “shall use every 
reasonable means to enforce this restraining order.”29  This language was 
included, in all capital letters, on the back of the restraining order issued to Ms. 
Gonzales by a Colorado court.30 
Despite the strong wording of such statutes, police regularly fail to follow 
these legislative mandates.  In these situations, it is difficult for victims to hold 
police accountable even when their refusal to enforce restraining orders results 
in egregious or fatal harm to victims of gender-based violence and their 
children.  The next section discusses these barriers to accountability. 
B. State Immunity from Claims of Ineffective Enforcement 
The Eleventh Amendment confers sovereign immunity upon state 
governments, protecting them from suit in both federal and state courts.31  
Local government entities, which include most police departments, are not 
protected by sovereign immunity.32  However, most jurisdictions have 
statutory provisions or caselaw stating that neither individual officers nor 
municipal entities may be held liable for a mere negligent failure to prevent the 
commission of a crime, unless the police had a special relationship with the 
victim, which exists only when the situation involves state-created danger or 
 
 27 See Miccio, supra note 22, at 420. 
 28 The text of the Colorado statute reads: “A peace officer shall arrest, or, if an arrest would be 
impractical under the circumstances, seek a warrant for the arrest of a restrained person” when the restrained 
person has violated a provision of the order.  COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-803.5(3)(b) (1999). 
 29 Gonzales Brief, supra note 2, at 7. 
 30 The mandate on the back of the restraining order states, “YOU SHALL USE EVERY REASONABLE 
MEANS TO ENFORCE THIS RESTRAINING ORDER.  YOU SHALL ARREST, OR, IF AN ARREST 
WOULD BE IMPRACTICAL UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, SEEK A WARRANT FOR THE 
ARREST OF THE RESTRAINED PERSON WHEN YOU HAVE INFORMATION AMOUNTING TO 
PROBABLE CAUSE THAT THE RESTRAINED PERSON HAS VIOLATED OR ATTEMPTED TO 
VIOLATE ANY PROVISION OF THIS ORDER . . . .”  Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 31 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 405–06 (5th ed. 2007). 
 32 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
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state custody of the victim.33  Therefore, unless a state legislature expressly 
lifts immunity by creating a specific cause of action against the police,34 a 
plaintiff-victim cannot hold an officer legally accountable for any state law 
tort.35  Because of the vast scope of police immunity, individuals harmed by 
police failure to respond or protect have little recourse, even when police abuse 
their discretion and disobey mandatory arrest laws. 
One of the only avenues through which individuals can challenge police 
conduct is 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which creates a federal cause of action when a 
person acting under color of state law causes the deprivation of an individual’s 
federal constitutional or statutory rights.36  A cause of action against an 
individual police officer under § 1983 requires a plaintiff to show (1) that the 
individual was acting under color of state law,37 and (2) that the conduct 
caused the deprivation of a constitutional or federal statutory right38 of the 
plaintiff-victim.39  While the potential for relief under § 1983 is theoretically 
 
 33 Miccio, supra note 22, at 429–30. 
 34 For further discussion of this possibility, see infra text accompanying notes 61–65. 
 35 Miccio, supra note 22, at 428.  The Supreme Court’s description of the public duty doctrine has been 
adopted by most state legislatures.  Id. at 429. 
 36 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any . . . person . . . to the deprivation of 
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in 
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”) 
 37 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).  Section 1983 creates a cause of action against 
individual officers who violate an individual’s constitutional right while acting under the color of law.  
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 31, at 492.  Historically, the cause of action was limited to individual officers, but 
the Court has since broadened its scope to allow a municipality (but not a state government) to be considered a 
person for § 1983 purposes.  Id. at 493, 508–09.  However, municipalities may not be held vicariously liable 
for the actions of individual officers; municipal liability extends only to official policies or customs that cause 
violations of the Constitution or federal law.  Id. at 493. 
 38 Although a federal statute could theoretically provide a cause of action under § 1983, the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Morrison forecloses this avenue for relief.  See supra note 14.  
 39 However, even if a plaintiff is successful in bringing a § 1983 claim, her options for relief are limited.  
While the text of § 1983 contemplates monetary damages as well as injunctive and declaratory relief, plaintiffs 
must clear an additional hurdle if they wish to recover damages from a police officer.  Police officers enjoy 
qualified immunity from civil suit for injuries caused by their discretionary conduct.  Pearson v. Callahan, 129 
S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009).  The purpose of the qualified immunity defense is to protect state actors from the 
perpetual fear of liability for every exercise of discretion, which would hinder their ability to fulfill their public 
function.  Kit Kinports, Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Cases: The Unanswered Questions, 23 GA. L. 
REV. 597, 600–01 (1989).  The protection provided by qualified immunity is vast: it is an affirmative defense 
that insulates officers from being sued at all, permitting complete dismissal of a claim against them.  Pearson, 
129 S. Ct. at 815.  The shield of qualified immunity can be lifted—and an officer exposed to liability for 
damages—only if the constitutional right violated by the officer was “clearly established.”  Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).  The field of jurisprudence surrounding § 1983 litigation and particularly 
the qualified immunity defense is extremely complicated and in constant flux.  SHELDON NAHMOD ET AL., 
CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS 461 (3d ed. 2010).  A complete discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this 
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expansive, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in this area has made it a 
complex remedy with limited practical application. 
C. Past Attempts to Overcome the Barriers of Immunity 
Over the years, the Supreme Court has limited the availability of § 1983-
based recourse for domestic violence victims by narrowing the scope of police 
actions that may qualify as a deprivation of a constitutional right.40  The Court 
has rejected claims made by victims of violence that police failures to protect 
violate their constitutional rights to either substantive or procedural due 
process, cutting off two of the three41 constitutional violations that would form 
the basis of a § 1983 challenge.  Subsections 1 and 2 summarize these past 
attempts under § 1983 to hold police liable for their failure to protect victims 
of violence and describe the reasoning used by the Court to reject these claims.  
In the wake of these decisions, many commentators have recommended that 
state courts and state legislatures act to increase police accountability.  The 
third subsection discusses these proposals in more depth and then explains why 
they would fail. 
1. Substantive Due Process 
The Supreme Court has denied a plaintiff-victim’s right to pursue state 
accountability for a failure to protect under the doctrine of substantive due 
process.  In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 
the Court denied recovery in a § 1983 suit against a county agency for failure 
to protect under a theory of substantive due process.42  The Court held that “a 
State’s failure to protect an individual against private violence simply does not 
constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause.”43  The Court decided that the 
Due Process Clause does not obligate the state to affirmatively provide 
protective services to an individual,44 unless a “special relationship” existed 
 
Comment.  However, it is important to note that a plaintiff-victim would have to show that an officer violated 
her right to equal protection, and that this particular equal protection right was clearly established, before she 
could recover any compensatory or punitive damages from an individual officer. 
 40 See Miccio, supra note 22, at 416. 
 41 The third is an individual’s right to equal protection of the law.  This will be discussed in much further 
detail in Parts II and III infra. 
 42 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
 43 Id. at 197. 
 44 This notion has become known as the public duty doctrine, which asserts that the police owe a duty to 
protect the public in general, as opposed to individual victims.  Miccio, supra note 22, at 428. 
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between that individual and the police.45  A special relationship does not exist 
between the State and an individual simply because the “State learns that a 
third party poses a special danger to an identified victim, and indicates its 
willingness to protect the victim against that danger.”46  The Court thus limited 
the scope of the special relationship doctrine to instances in which an 
individual is in the custody of the state or the state is responsible for creating 
the danger posed to the victim.47  The Court emphasized the distinction 
between a constitutional duty to protect, which could render the state liable 
under a § 1983 due process cause of action, and a duty to protect under state 
tort law, which could give the victim a cause of action in state court for a 
breach of duty under state law.48  The law in this area is unlikely to change 
because of the vast acceptance of the public duty doctrine.49 
2. Procedural Due Process 
In 2004, the Court likewise rejected procedural due process as a means of 
holding police liable for failure to protect gender-based violence victims.  
After her daughters were killed, Jessica Gonzales sued the Castle Rock Police 
Department, as well as several individual officers, under § 1983 for violations 
of her procedural due process rights.  She argued that “she had a property 
interest in police enforcement of the restraining order against her husband; and 
that the town deprived her of this property without due process by having a 
policy that tolerated nonenforcement of restraining orders.”50  The Supreme 
Court ultimately rejected her claim, holding that she did not have a property 
interest in police enforcement because procedural due process does not protect 
benefits for which a person has only “an abstract need or desire” or “a 
unilateral expectation.”51  Rather, the procedural due process doctrine protects 
only those benefits to which an individual has a “legitimate claim of 
entitlement.”52  In other words, procedural due process claims are only 
 
 45 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197–99. 
 46 Id. at 197 n.4. 
 47 Id. at 200; Miccio, supra note 22, at 428. 
 48 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201.  For a more detailed discussion of state tort liability, see also infra text 
accompanying notes 61–65. 
 49 Miccio, supra note 22, at 428–29; see also Hudson v. Hudson, 475 F.3d 741, 745 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(rejecting, on similar facts, the plaintiff’s arguments that the police could be liable to the victim under either 
the special relationship or the state-created-danger theory). 
 50 Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 755 (2005). 
 51 Id. at 756 (quoting Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)) (internal 
quotation mark omitted). 
 52 Id. (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 577). 
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available when the individual has been promised a tangible benefit by the state, 
usually in the form of monetary assistance or a more traditional interest such as 
real property. 
Writing for the Castle Rock majority, Justice Scalia stated that an 
individual cannot claim that a benefit is a protected entitlement if the benefit is 
subject to the state’s discretion.53  He then declared that “[a] well established 
tradition of police discretion has long coexisted with apparently mandatory 
arrest statutes”54 such that Colorado’s mandatory arrest statute was not truly 
mandatory.55  For a state to create an entitlement by statute, the language of the 
statute would have to indicate more strongly that police were required to act.56  
Moreover, he opined that  
[i]t is hard to imagine that a Colorado peace officer would not have 
some discretion to determine that—despite probable cause to believe 
a restraining order has been violated—the circumstances of the 
violation or the competing duties of that officer or his agency counsel 
decisively against enforcement in a particular instance.57 
Castle Rock effectively forecloses any possibility of bringing a procedural 
due process claim for purposes of police liability in the future.  Given Justice 
Scalia’s broad language, it will be nearly impossible to create a statute worded 
strongly enough to satisfy the majority’s standard.58  Furthermore, Justice 
Scalia asserted that even if a statute did create a recognizable entitlement, that 
still might not be enough to merit protection of a property interest.59  The 
majority’s reasoning functionally eliminates the possibility of success for a 
future procedural due process claim, and indeed several federal courts have 
rejected other gender-based violence survivors’ claims based on the reasoning 
in Castle Rock.60 
 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. at 760. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id.  The Court concluded that the Colorado statute failed to indicate strongly enough that police were 
required to act to protect victims because the statute gave officers a choice of actions: they could either arrest 
the individual whom they had probable cause to believe violated the restraining order, or they could seek a 
warrant if arrest was impracticable.  This choice, the majority reasoned, left room for police discretion and fell 
short of creating an entitlement to protection.  Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Curt Stokes, Note, Restraining Orders and Law Enforcement Liability After Town of Castle Rock, 
Colorado v. Gonzales, 26 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 99, 120–21 (2007). 
 59 Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 766. 
 60 Amber Fink, Every Reasonable Means: Due Process and the (Non)enforcement of a Restraining Order 
in Gonzales v. Town of Castle Rock, 24 LAW & INEQ. 375, 395 (2006).  Many critics of the Castle Rock 
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3. State Tort Remedy 
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Castle Rock, many commentators 
have advocated for the creation of a state tort remedy, as suggested by both the 
Castle Rock and DeShaney majority opinions,61 which would allow victims to 
sue police officers and police departments under state tort law for failure to 
enforce a restraining order despite a mandatory arrest statute.62  However, this 
type of reform likely will be unsuccessful at both the legislative and judicial 
levels.  Police lobbies are influential and police departments have significant 
political clout, making it unrealistic to think that legislatures would enact such 
legislation.63  For example, one article written after the Castle Rock decision 
advocates a strict liability standard for police departments when an officer fails 
to arrest despite having probable cause to believe that a restraining order has 
been violated.64  Given the high deference shown to law enforcement in Castle 
 
decision have argued that Justice Scalia’s opinion goes against extensive legislative history documenting the 
intent of the Colorado legislature to remove police discretion in domestic violence situations.  See, e.g., Castle 
Rock, 545 U.S. at 779–83 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Critics and feminist scholars have also argued that Justice 
Scalia’s conclusion disregards the plain meaning of the word “shall” in the statute and reflects the Court’s 
continuing indifference to victims of gender-based violence.  See, e.g., Miccio, supra note 22, at 420.  After 
the Supreme Court ruled against her, Jessica Gonzales filed suit against the United States in the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, alleging that the United States had violated her human rights by 
failing to protect her and her children from Mr. Gonzales’s actions.  Gonzales Brief, supra note 2.  That 
decision is pending; if Ms. Gonzales wins, it will be a strong critique of the Court’s historical resistance to 
require police officers to protect women from gender-based violence.  The European Court of Human Rights 
recently heard a similar case, Opuz v. Turkey, in which a Turkish victim of domestic violence sued the Turkish 
government for its failure to protect her and her family members from violence by her husband.  In a landmark 
decision, the court ruled for the plaintiff-victim and, for the first time, held a government accountable for 
failure “to take adequate steps to protect victims of repeated domestic violence, even absent any active 
malfeasance on the state’s part.”  Tarik Abdel-Monem, Opuz v. Turkey: Europe’s Landmark Judgment on 
Violence Against Women, 17 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 29, 29 (2009).  Especially interesting is that the court agreed 
with the plaintiff that the Turkish government violated, inter alia, the prohibition on discrimination contained 
in the European Convention on Human Rights.  Id. 
 61 Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 768–69; DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 
201–03 (1989). 
 62 See, e.g., Joshua J. Bennett, Case Note, Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales and the Awful Truth: Utah’s 
Mandatory Enforcement Laws Make Police Enforcement of a Victim’s Protective Order Optional, 8 J.L. & 
FAM. STUD. 405, 422–23 (2006); Danielle Lynn Lordi, Comment, Police Liability Under State Tort Law for 
Failure to Enforce Protection Orders: The Last Demand for Accountability, 85 OR. L. REV. 325, 346–49 
(2006); Stefanie T. Scott, Note, Trying to Touch the Untouchables: The Challenges Faced by Texas Plaintiffs 
Asserting Failure-to-Protect Suits Against Police Departments, 27 REV. LITIG. 539, 557–60 (2008); Stokes, 
supra note 58, at 125. 
 63 KRISTIAN WILLIAMS, OUR ENEMIES IN BLUE: POLICE AND POWER IN AMERICA 2, 139 (2004) (“Few 
changes in public safety or security policies can be made without the tacit approval of the police unions, and 
the officers’ associations are routinely consulted on changes in the criminal code, or in city policies that might 
indirectly affect police work.”). 
 64 Lordi, supra note 62, at 348. 
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Rock, it is improbable that any legislature would ever impose such a strict 
standard on the police. 
Also, the historical deference to police discretion is too entrenched for a 
state tort cause of action to be a plausible strategy.  Even if states do enact 
legislation exposing police to liability, it is unlikely that the elected judges who 
sit on many state courts will rule in favor of plaintiffs and slap police officers 
or departments with large monetary penalties by awarding substantial 
damages.65  Low damage awards will fail to provide the incentive necessary 
for police officers and police departments to change their practices with regard 
to victims of gender-based violence. 
D. Making the Case for Police Accountability: Why Police Enforcement Is 
Necessary 
There are several compelling reasons for encouraging police enforcement 
of protective orders.  First, when enforced, restraining orders are effective at 
curbing violence by both decreasing the likelihood of a future attack66 and 
deterring a rise in the severity of future attacks.67  Second, failing to enforce a 
restraining order negatively affects a victim’s ability to escape her situation in 
a very real way.  The risk of homicide by an abusive partner is highest when a 
victim decides to leave a relationship,68 and obtaining an order of protection 
may be an indication that a victim is preparing to leave or has left.  Thus, an 
abused woman69 and her children may be most vulnerable at the time that she 
 
 65 Miccio, supra note 22, at 428. 
 66 Victoria L. Holt et al., Do Protection Orders Affect the Likelihood of Future Partner Violence and 
Injury?, 24 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. 16, 18–21 (2003). 
 67 Adele Harrell & Barbara E. Smith, Effects of Restraining Orders on Domestic Violence Victims, in DO 
ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 214, 234 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1996) (“The 
odds of severe violence in cases in which an arrest had been made were less than half that of cases in which no 
arrest had been made [in the year following the arrest].”). 
 68 Jacquelyn C. Campbell et al., Risk Factors for Femicide in Abusive Relationships: Results from a 
Multisite Case Control Study, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1089, 1090 (2003).  Moreover, there is evidence that 
suggests that obtaining a restraining order itself can increase the likelihood of retaliatory violence, making its 
enforcement even more important to avoid endangering the victim rather than protecting her.  Fink, supra note 
60, at 379–80 (citing Brief of National Network to End Domestic Violence et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 20, Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (No. 04-278)). 
 69 This Comment recognizes that gender-based violence occurs against both men and women, but it 
refers to victims as women because of the endemic and disproportionate prevalence of gender-based violence 
by men against women.  Similarly, not all police officers are men, and the use of gendered pronouns runs the 
risk of incurring the same criticism that forms the premise of the argument advanced by this Comment.  
However, for the sake of differentiation between officers and victims, and having made this concession, this 
Comment will refer to police officers using the male pronoun where necessary for clarity. 
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obtains a protective order;70 lack of enforcement may expose her to a brutal 
attack, or death.71 
Third, nonenforcement communicates to abusers that they are invulnerable, 
silently condoning their actions and emboldening them.  This exposes the 
victim to further harm by a perpetrator who feels that he is above the law.  For 
example, in a case where a woman was killed after numerous violations of a 
restraining order and multiple calls to the police for help over several months,72 
her ex-husband reportedly used to “boast[] to friends and others in the 
community that the deputy sheriffs were on his side, that the Sheriff protected 
him and not [the victim].  [He] would torment [her] with the same gibe.”73  
Failure to enforce restraining orders perpetuates in communities the idea that 
gender-based violence is tolerable and will not result in any legal 
consequences. 
Finally, issuing a restraining order and then failing or refusing to enforce it 
creates a false sense of security for a victim who mistakenly relies on the 
promise of police protection.74  This may result in worse harm than the victim 
would have experienced had she taken better steps to protect herself, knowing 
that no one else would help her.  For example, Jessica Gonzales explicitly 
stated: “Had I known that the police would do nothing to locate Rebecca, 
Katheryn, and Leslie or enforce my restraining order, I would have taken the 
situation into my own hands by looking for my children with my family and 
friends.”75  Police indifference fosters distrust of law enforcement and the 
criminal justice system among victims.76 
 
 70 For example, the Gonzales tragedy occurred one month after Ms. Gonzales obtained a divorce and 
permanent restraining order against her husband.  Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 753. 
 71 See, e.g., id.; Estate of Macias v. Ihde, 219 F.3d 1018, 1026 (9th Cir. 2000) (ex-husband shot and 
killed victim, as well as victim’s mother and himself, after police officer told victim there was probable cause 
that ex-husband had violated restraining order and would be arrested); Hynson v. City of Chester, Legal Dep’t, 
864 F.2d 1026 (3d Cir. 1988) (estranged boyfriend murdered victim at her place of work after stalking her and 
breaking into her home in the middle of the night in violation of a recently expired emergency restraining 
order). 
 72 Ihde, 219 F.3d at 1021–25. 
 73 Estate of Macias v. Lopez, 42 F. Supp. 2d 957, 960 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (internal quotation mark 
omitted), rev’d sub nom. Estate of Macias v. Ihde, 219 F.3d 1018, 1026 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 74 Jennifer Rios, Note, What’s the Hold-Up? Making the Case for Lifetime Orders of Protection in New 
York State, 12 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 709, 728–29 (2006). 
 75 Jessica Gonzales, Statement Before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Mar. 2, 2007), 
available at http://www.aclu.org/human-rights-womens-rights/jessica-gonzales-statement-iachr. 
 76 Press Release, Nat’l Crime Victim Bar Ass’n, National Crime Victim Bar Association Asks Supreme 
Court to Rule in Favor of Victims on Protective Orders (Feb. 11, 2005), available at http://www.ncvc.org/vb/ 
AGP.Net/Components/documentViewer/Download.aspxnz?DocumentID=39534. 
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Thus, it is essential that the law create a credible way of holding police 
officers and departments accountable for nonenforcement of restraining orders 
in cases of gender-based violence.  Without a credible basis for suit, police 
accountability is no more than an empty threat, and police officers will 
continue to disregard the safety of gender-based violence victims.77 
II. EQUAL PROTECTION: A BELEAGUERED AVENUE FOR POLICE 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
The only remaining avenue for police liability is a § 1983 claim that police 
failure to enforce restraining orders denies victims their right to equal 
protection of the law.78  The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment states that “[n]o state shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”79  The purpose of this protection 
is to ensure that all persons who are similarly situated are afforded the same 
treatment.80 
This Part introduces the possibility of bringing equal protection claims 
against police officers who fail to enforce restraining orders.  Section A 
reviews the history of the equal protection doctrine and current equal 
protection jurisprudence under the Constitution.  Section B discusses past 
equal protection claims that have failed in the lower federal courts.  In 
particular, this section notes the possible levels of scrutiny with which an equal 
protection claim in this context could be reviewed, as well as the shortcomings 
of the arguments advanced by past plaintiff-victims. 
A. Background and Summary of Equal Protection Under the Constitution 
The Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence is comprised of three 
tiers of judicial review.  Any classification used by the state to distinguish 
between persons, whether written into a statute or used in a more subtle way, 
 
 77 Miccio, supra note 22, at 416.  In cases such as Castle Rock, where the abuser kills himself or is 
otherwise killed, neither recovery nor individual accountability is possible, highlighting the need for law 
enforcement accountability and prevention. 
 78 In DeShaney, the majority recognized that “[t]he State may not, of course, selectively deny its 
protective services to certain disfavored minorities without violating the Equal Protection Clause.”  DeShaney 
v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 n.3 (1989). 
 79 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 80 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 676 (3d ed. 2006) (noting 
that equal protection principles protect individuals, not groups, and that an individual can bring an equal 
protection claim for discrimination in the form of arbitrary government treatment even against a “class of one” 
(quoting Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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must pass some level of review by a court because the law presumes that 
persons similarly situated should be treated alike.81  The level of review that a 
classification will receive depends on the basis of the classification itself.82  
The Court has deemed that certain classifications, such as race and national 
origin, are almost never an appropriate basis on which to discriminate between 
persons; accordingly, these classifications are reviewed under strict scrutiny.83  
For the state to classify or discriminate on the basis of race or another suspect 
class, the state must advance a “compelling” interest, and the state action or 
policy must be narrowly tailored to achieve the stated government interest.84  If 
the government interest is not sufficiently compelling, or if a less over- or 
under-inclusive policy could achieve the government interest, then the statute 
or classification will be struck down as an unconstitutional violation of the 
equal protection clause.85 
The next level of review is intermediate scrutiny.  As its name suggests, 
this level of review is less rigorous than strict scrutiny.86  Gender is one 
classification that receives intermediate scrutiny.87  For a state actor to justify a 
classification or discrimination based on gender, it must advance an 
“important” government interest and demonstrate that the classification is 
“substantially related” to achieving this interest.88  The rationale advanced by 
the Court for applying a lesser level of scrutiny in these cases is that, unlike 
individuals of different races or national origins, the sexes do manifest some 
“inherent differences.”89  On the other hand, these classifications must undergo 
some scrutiny “to assure that the validity of a classification is determined 
through reasoned analysis rather than through the mechanical application of 
traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions about the proper roles of men and 
women.”90  Due to these competing principles, cases reviewed under the 
intermediate scrutiny standard have had mixed success in the federal courts.91 
 
 81 Id. at 669–70. 
 82 Id. at 670. 
 83 Id. at 671. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. at 671–72. 
 87 Id. at 671. 
 88 Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982). 
 89 United States v. Virginia (VMI), 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 90 Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725–26. 
 91 The Supreme Court has invalidated many gender-based classifications challenged under the Equal 
Protection Clause, but has upheld some.  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 80, at 672; see also infra Part III.B.1.b. 
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While classifications that are overtly or explicitly based on gender will 
automatically receive intermediate scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny is harder to 
invoke when the classification is neutral on its face but has an adverse impact 
on one gender.  In these instances, a court will only apply intermediate scrutiny 
if the plaintiff can demonstrate that the intent behind the policy was to 
discriminate against the gender that is disproportionately affected.92  
Otherwise, even in the face of an extremely disparate impact on one gender, a 
facially neutral classification will receive rational basis review.93 
All other classifications, such as age, sexual orientation, and disability, also 
receive the most lenient level of judicial scrutiny: rational basis review.94  For 
a classification to pass muster under rational basis review, the government can 
simply advance a “legitimate” interest and show that the classification is 
reasonably related to achieving that interest.95  The purpose of this basis of 
review is to prevent the state from making arbitrary distinctions between 
people merely on the basis of hostility toward a particular group.96  However, 
rational basis review provides little protection as long as the government can 
advance some non-arbitrary reason to justify the classification.97 
The distinction between rational basis review and intermediate scrutiny is 
important because the level of review largely determines the outcome of the 
case.  The claim of a plaintiff alleging that police treated her differently 
because of her status as a victim of domestic violence—that the discrimination 
was based on the type of crime, or the type of relationship between the victim 
and abuser—would receive only rational basis review.  However, a plaintiff-
victim has a much greater chance of success if her claim is reviewed with 
intermediate scrutiny. 
B. Past Attempts to Obtain Intermediate Scrutiny: Discrimination Against 
Women or Against Victims of Domestic Violence? 
In the past several decades, many lower federal courts have heard cases 
with facts similar to Castle Rock, in which either a victim-spouse or her 
 
 92 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 80, at 672. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. at 677–78. 
 97 Id. 
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children were severely injured or killed by a partner.98  In Hynson v. City of 
Chester, Legal Department, the Third Circuit noted a “growing trend of 
plaintiffs relying upon the due process and equal protection clauses, 
enforceable through § 1983, to force police departments to provide women 
with the protection from domestic violence that police agencies are allegedly 
reluctant to give.”99  The Hynson court noted the distinction between 
“discrimination on the basis of . . . membership in the class of victims of 
domestic abuse,” which would receive rational basis review, and 
discrimination based on sex or gender, which would require intermediate 
scrutiny.100 
While the Supreme Court has never reviewed this type of claim,101 the 
rationales of lower courts, as well as related Supreme Court jurisprudence, 
strongly suggest that the Court would deny an equal protection claim that 
relied on arguments similar to the ones lower courts have heard.  The 
following subsection reviews the arguments that victims have advanced, as 
well as the reasoning of the various courts that have adjudicated and denied 
these claims. 
1. Failed Attempts at Intermediate Scrutiny 
Given the difficulty of successfully challenging state action under rational 
basis review, a key task is to convince a court to invoke intermediate scrutiny.  
Most plaintiff-victims have attempted to do so using some species of a 
disparate impact argument.  They have alleged that failure to enforce the 
restraining order of a domestic violence victim is gender-based discrimination 
because women are primarily (and disproportionately) affected by domestic 
 
 98 See, e.g., Hynson v. City of Chester, Legal Dep’t, 864 F.2d 1026 (3d Cir. 1988); Watson v. City of 
Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690, 693 (10th Cir. 1988) (husband, a police officer himself, raped, beat, and stabbed 
victim-spouse in the presence of her children, in violation of a restraining order, before committing suicide); 
Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521, 1527–29 (D. Conn. 1984) (ex-husband repeatedly stabbed 
victim in the chest, neck, and throat, in violation of a restraining order, and continued assault after police 
arrived, kicking victim in the head multiple times, grabbing her child from inside the residence, and dropping 
child on wounded victim before being arrested). 
 99 864 F.2d at 1030. 
 100 Id. at 1031. 
 101 All of these plaintiff-victims had obtained a civil protection order before their attacks.  Most sued 
police departments on both due process and equal protection grounds.  This Comment will only discuss the 
courts’ equal protection analyses since the Supreme Court has rejected both procedural and substantive due 
process theories as a basis for bringing a § 1983 action on these facts. 
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violence.  In other words, police policies and practices102 that provide lesser 
protection to domestic violence victims discriminate against women, violating 
their right to equal protection of the law.  These past attempts to invoke 
intermediate scrutiny have failed for two reasons: (1) lack of data showing that 
police policies affecting domestic violence victims disproportionately affect 
women, and (2) failure to meet the strict standard for invoking intermediate 
scrutiny in the context of a facially neutral classification.  This subsection 
describes in detail the reasoning with which past litigants’ claims have been 
rejected.103 
a. Lack of Data to Demonstrate Discriminatory Policies 
The first roadblock faced by plaintiff-victims is a lack of data to prove the 
existence of a discriminatory policy.  Because their claims are premised on the 
existence of a policy that discriminates against all domestic violence survivors, 
rather than just the treatment afforded to a particular plaintiff, this data is a 
necessary element. 
 
 102 Many of the equal protection claims discussed in this section consisted of both an action against an 
individual officer and an action against the police department itself for a municipal liability claim.  See supra 
note 32 and accompanying text.  A municipal liability claim differs from a claim against an individual officer 
because a victim can sue the police department only if the entity itself caused the constitutional violation.  
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).  Municipal liability requires the plaintiff to show that the 
municipality had a policy or custom that caused the violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional right.  Id. at 694.  
However, claims of this type are difficult to prove because there must be “a direct causal link between a 
municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation.”  City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 
378, 391 (1989).  However, municipal liability claims provide deeper pockets for damage awards, as the city 
itself must pay the damages, whereas a claim against an individual officer will expose only that officer to 
personal liability.  Id.  For the argument advanced by this Comment, however, additional distinctions between 
municipal liability and individual officer liability are ancillary and will not be discussed in detail. 
 103 Prior to DeShaney, one district court allowed a plaintiff to bring a § 1983 equal protection claim 
against the police on the basis of gender because it found that the police department’s practice of affording 
inadequate protection to domestic-violence-related calls operated as an administrative classification that 
implemented the law in a discriminatory fashion on the basis of sex.  Thurman, 595 F. Supp. at 1527–29 
(denying city’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s equal protection claim).  Tracey Thurman was awarded $2.3 
million by a federal jury.  Anne Sparks, Feminists Negotiate the Executive Branch: The Policing of Male 
Violence, in FEMINISTS NEGOTIATE THE STATE: THE POLITICS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 35, 42 (Cynthia R. 
Daniels et al. eds., 1997).  However, the Thurman court’s rationale is no longer good law.  The district court 
based its decision on a finding that the police had an affirmative duty to protect the plaintiff-victim because 
they were aware of her situation.  Thurman, 595 F. Supp. at 1527.  Four years later, in DeShaney, the Supreme 
Court rejected this notion, stating that the police never have an affirmative duty to protect an individual unless 
the individual is in state custody.  It explicitly rejected the argument that state knowledge of the risk or danger 
faced by the victim is sufficient to create a special relationship that would trigger an affirmative duty to 
protect.  DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197–200 (1989). 
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In Hynson, the Third Circuit created a three-factor test to determine 
whether a plaintiff could make a prima facie case for an equal protection 
violation on the basis of gender.104  The first factor of this test requires a 
plaintiff to provide sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could 
infer that the police had a policy or custom to provide less protection to 
domestic violence victims than to victims of other types of violence.105  This 
factor presents a significant hurdle for individual litigants.  Because most 
police departments do not collect data about their response rates to reported 
problems, and individual victims do not have the resources or ability to 
conduct significant research in preparation for their litigation,  many plaintiff-
victims’ arguments will be foreclosed at this step.106 
For instance, in 2007, the Third Circuit rejected Jill Burella’s equal 
protection claim in which she alleged discrimination on the basis of gender.107  
Burella alleged that the Philadelphia Police Department had a custom or policy 
of providing domestic violence victims with less protection than other victims 
of violence.108  She argued the court should infer discriminatory intent on the 
basis of gender.109  As evidence to support this inference, she provided a police 
sergeant’s statement that victims of domestic violence were predominantly 
women and an expert report that stated that the Philadelphia Police Department 
discriminated against female victims of domestic violence.110 
The Third Circuit declined to infer a custom of inferior protection to 
domestic violence victims and stated that, 
 
 104 The court stated that its rationale for this three-part standard was “to eliminate the all too common 
shotgun pleading approach to these equal protection claims.”  Hynson, 864 F.2d at 1031 n.13.  After laying out 
this standard, the appeals court remanded the case to the district court to apply the test.  On remand, the district 
court in Hynson found sufficient evidence for a jury to infer an intent to discriminate against women, but still 
granted summary judgment for the police officers on the basis of qualified immunity.  Hynson v. City of 
Chester, 731 F. Supp. 1236, 1240–41 (E.D. Pa. 1990).  In its decision, the district court did not give any 
indication as to how it would have decided had this immunity not been available. 
 105 Hynson, 864 F.2d at 1031.  The second and third factors of this test require that discrimination against 
women was a motivating factor in this policy and that the plaintiff was injured by this policy or custom.  Id.  
See infra Part II.B.1.b. for discussion of the second factor.  Many circuit courts have adopted the Hynson test 
or one that is analogous.  See, e.g., Soto v. Flores, 103 F.3d 1056 (1st Cir. 1997); Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 
712 (9th Cir. 1995); Eagleston v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865 (2d Cir. 1994); Ricketts v. City of Columbia, 36 F.3d 
775 (8th Cir. 1994); McKee v. City of Rockwall, 877 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1989). 
 106 See, e.g., Scott, supra note 62, at 559–62. 
 107 Burella v. City of Phila., 501 F.3d 134 (3d Cir. 2007).  In addition to her equal protection claim, Jill 
Burella also brought § 1983 challenges on the basis of substantive and procedural due process.  The Third 
Circuit denied both due process claims based on the precedents in DeShaney and Castle Rock. 
 108 Id. at 148. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. at 148–49. 
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[w]hile statistical evidence and individual arrest records are 
not per se requirements in this context, such evidence may often be 
crucial.  Indeed, in this case there is a marked absence of any 
comparable evidence (or even factual allegations) from which a 
reasonable jury could find an unlawful custom or infer a 
discriminatory motive.111 
A concurring judge observed that “[s]tate protection-from-abuse statutes seem 
to reside in a rock-solid castle of narrow construction barring any federal 
constitutional relief for the very victims that the statutes are designed to 
protect.”112 
Based on the court’s reasoning and its application of existing precedent, 
statistical data regarding the differential response to women affected by 
domestic violence is a necessary prerequisite to succeeding on an equal 
protection claim that alleges discrimination on the basis of gender.  Absent this 
type of data, there is no way to allege a sound gender-based equal protection 
argument. 
b. Feeney’s Overly Stringent Standard: Showing a Discriminatory 
Purpose 
Further complicating the plaintiff’s burden is that even if she does have 
data demonstrating that women are disproportionately affected by a police 
practice relegating domestic violence calls to low-priority status, disparate 
impact alone is not enough to constitute an equal protection violation when the 
basis of the classification is not actually gender.  In Personnel Administrator v. 
Feeney, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff challenging a facially gender-
neutral law but asserting a gender-based discrimination claim had to show that 
the classification was adopted to purposefully discriminate against women.113  
This standard demands that the plaintiff show more than just that the policy 
had been adopted “in spite of” its adverse effects on women.114  Rather, the 
plaintiff must show that the policy was adopted “because of” its adverse effects 
on women.115 
 
 111 Id. at 149. 
 112 Id. at 150 (Ambro, J., concurring in part). 
 113 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). 
 114 The Court effectively stated that a showing of disparate impact alone, no matter how extreme, was not 
an actionable violation of equal protection.  Id. 
 115 Id. 
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The second factor from the Hynson court’s three-factor test, that the victim 
show “a discriminatory purpose [against women] behind the policy,”116 was 
adopted from Feeney.  Based on current Supreme Court jurisprudence, a 
gender-based violence victim would have to demonstrate that police officers or 
a police department did not respond to her call because they had a policy to 
provide women—not just domestic violence victims—with an inferior standard 
of protection.  This standard is nearly impossible to meet because the vast 
majority of formal inequality has been erased from the books, and 
discrimination now exists in much more subtle forms and at the level of 
individual officer discretion rather than department-wide policy. 
In Watson v. City of Kansas City, a victim-plaintiff sued the local police 
department claiming discrimination against abused spouses as a matter of 
training or unwritten policy or custom.117  The victim was the spouse of a 
police officer in the Kansas City police department, and she had statistics 
demonstrating the dissimilar arrest rates for domestic and nondomestic 
disputes.118  But the Tenth Circuit rejected her argument that this disparity was 
sex discrimination, citing Feeney for the proposition that a disparate impact on 
women is not enough.119  More recently, in Okin v. Village of Cornwall-on-
Hudson Police Department, the Second Circuit similarly held that “[p]roof that 
discriminatory intent [on the basis of sex] was a motivating factor is required 
to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”120 
Unable to meet the exceptionally high standard required to make a 
cognizable gender-based equal protection claim,121 victims are thus left with 
the difficult task of establishing that a classification on the basis of domestic, 
as opposed to stranger, violence fails rational basis review. 
 
 116 Hynson v. City of Chester, Legal Dep’t, 864 F.2d 1026, 1031 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 117 857 F.2d 690, 694 (10th Cir. 1988). 
 118 Id. at 695. 
 119 Id. at 696–97 (citations omitted). 
 120 577 F.3d 415, 438 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 121 Prior to Castle Rock but after DeShaney, the Ninth Circuit heard a case in which the district court 
granted summary judgment to police officers against a plaintiff who alleged violation of her right to equal 
protection on the basis of both domestic-violence-victim status and gender.  Estate of Macias v. Ihde, 219 F.3d 
1018, 1028–29 (9th Cir. 2000).  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment and 
remanded to the district court.  Id.  The police department then settled with the victim’s family for one million 
dollars.  Lordi, supra note 62, at 336 n.71 (citing Sonoma County, California, Sheriff’s Department Settles 
Domestic Violence Murder Case for One Million Dollars, 8 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REP. 1, 15 (2002)).  This 
case, while encouraging, still does not provide a model for a successful equal protection challenge because it 
did not reach trial. 
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2. Rational Basis Review: An Impossible Standard to Meet 
Several courts have heard cases with facts similar to Castle Rock, in which 
the plaintiff-victim alleged discrimination on the basis of her status as a victim 
of violence by a domestic partner as opposed to violence by a stranger.122  In 
each of these cases, the plaintiff had to establish statistical or empirical 
evidence indicating that police attitude and response to domestic violence 
victims was dissimilar to police behavior when faced with a request for help 
from a victim of stranger assault.123  The cases suggest that while many of 
these plaintiffs were able to survive summary judgment, this argument is 
unlikely to succeed on the merits because of the lack of data available to 
support empirical claims.124 
Furthermore, the rational basis test itself makes it extremely difficult for a 
plaintiff to prevail.  Under rational basis review, the government simply has to 
show that the classification reasonably relates to a legitimate government 
interest.125  This standard is “enormously deferential” to the government, and 
plaintiffs rarely prevail under this level of review.126  Moreover, unlike 
intermediate scrutiny, under which the government has the burden to prove 
that its interest is important and the classification is substantially related, under 
rational basis review, the burden is on the plaintiff to show the classification 
fails the rational basis test.127  Finally, under the rational basis test, a court will 
accept any legitimate purpose the government can come up with, even if it is 
simply pretext for another discriminatory purpose; in intermediate scrutiny, a 
court will evaluate whether the proffered justification is the actual reason the 
government adopted the classification.  If it is not, the court will reject the 
classification as unconstitutional.128  In most cases, police will be able to come 
up with some rational reason to justify discrimination between victims of 
domestic violence and those of other forms of violence.  The hurdles inherent 
in rational basis review make it highly unlikely that a plaintiff-victim would 
prevail in proving the unconstitutionality of actions that are alleged to 
differentiate between domestic and nondomestic violence victims. 
 
 122 See, e.g., Hynson v. City of Chester, Legal Dep’t, 864 F.2d 1026, 1026 (3d Cir. 1988); Watson, 857 
F.2d at 690. 
 123 See, e.g., Watson, 857 F.2d at 696. 
 124 See, e.g., Scott, supra note 62, at 559–62. 
 125 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 80, at 672. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. at 683. 
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In the discussion above, the ultimate problem for each plaintiff-victim was 
that her claim required the court to infer that a particular victim’s experience 
was representative of other women’s experiences.  Each individual claim was 
unable to stand alone on its own facts.129  This Comment addresses this 
problem by developing an equal protection claim that challenges an individual 
police officer’s actions as they relate to a particular victim.  The argument 
presented here will allow a court to evaluate a plaintiff’s claim based on its 
own individual facts and still invoke intermediate scrutiny. 
III.  REFORMULATING THE CLAIM: REVIVING INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY FOR 
VICTIMS OF GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE 
The dearth of viable litigation strategies for victims of gender-based 
violence makes clear the need for a new framework for arguing equal 
protection claims.  This Comment proposes a claim that reshapes the way in 
which litigants conceive of and present the elements of an equal protection 
claim to create a successful federal constitutional claim for police liability. 
To accomplish this, the first task is to identify the government action; the 
next step is to frame the classification it makes as one based on gender.  The 
final step is to apply the intermediate scrutiny test and evaluate whether the 
government action is substantially related to an important government interest.  
The following sections take up each of these steps in turn. 
A. The Government Action and Triggering Intermediate Scrutiny: Gender-
Based Stereotypes Instead of Disparate Impact 
The task in this section is to develop an equal protection argument that 
invokes gender, and thus intermediate scrutiny, without relying on a disparate 
impact argument.  Subsection 1 pinpoints the government action in question 
here: the exercise of discretion by a police officer at the moment when he must 
decide whether to respond to a victim of violence.  Subsection 2 then details 
how to frame that action as one based on gender: by identifying an officer’s 
inappropriate use of gendered stereotypes in deciding not to respond to a 
victim. 
 
 129 In Okin, the Second Circuit noted the district court’s finding that the plaintiff “relie[d] exclusively on 
her own story—which, while heartrending, does not get her where [the test] says she must go.”  Okin v. 
Cornwall-on-Hudson Police Dep’t, 577 F.3d 415, 438 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Okin v. Cornwall-on-Hudson 
Police Dep’t, No. 04 Civ. 3679 (CM), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75881, at *58 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2006)) 
(internal quotation mark omitted). 
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1. The Government Action 
To begin formulating a new equal protection claim, it is necessary first to 
identify the government action that allegedly violates the Equal Protection 
Clause.  One way to conceptualize the government action is the exercise of 
discretion by a police officer or department at the moment a victim calls 
claiming a restraining order has been violated.  But this conceptualization puts 
us right back at Castle Rock.130  Thus, it is necessary to concede that a police 
officer’s ability to use discretion is almost certain to pass constitutional muster, 
even under the intermediate scrutiny standard. 
But the question of how the police officer or department uses that discretion 
is a different matter.  In a case like that of Jessica Gonzales, several state actors 
exercise discretion in a way that ultimately results in the harm suffered.  A 
victim’s contact with the police begins with a 911 call, answered by a 
dispatcher.  As soon as the dispatcher hears the situation, she must decide how 
to respond to the phone call.  She could dispatch an officer to the scene 
immediately, ignore the call entirely, or do something in between, such as 
make a note in a file and ask the victim to wait and call back if the children do 
not return within a few hours.  When the dispatcher decides which action to 
take in response to the allegation that the abuser has violated his restraining 
order, the dispatcher is exercising discretion.  Next, if the dispatcher does send 
an officer to assist the victim, the action that officer takes once he arrives and 
sees that the children are missing also involves an exercise of discretion.  He 
could immediately begin to search for them, determine that no such action 
would be worthwhile and return to the police station without assisting the 
victim, or do something in between, such as check the registry to see if the 
restraining order was valid or make a note in a file. 
The key inquiry for the equal protection claim developed by this Comment 
is: What motivated each officer’s decision?  On what basis did he exercise his 
discretion?  While an officer is permitted to exercise his discretion when 
undertaking a police duty, he must do so in a constitutional way—one that 
does not violate the victim’s right to equal protection.  That is, the basis on 
which the police officer decides how to respond to a victim may not take into 
account or treat her differently based on a protected status.  Thus, if the 
victim’s sex influences the decision the officer makes, in his discretion, about 
 
 130 See supra text accompanying notes 50–60. 
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what action to take, then there is an equal protection claim.131  Whether the 
officer’s action actually violates the Equal Protection Clause, however, will 
depend on the basis of the classification, the government interest the officer 
advances by exercising this discretion, and the relationship between the action 
he takes and the government interest he advances.  The following subsection 
describes the classification in this instance: gender, as understood in the 
context of gender-based stereotypes.  It begins with a discussion of relevant 
Supreme Court jurisprudence in the area of gender-based stereotypes, followed 
by a development of the argument that it is unconstitutional for police officers 
to use gendered stereotypes in responding to gender-based violence survivors. 
2. Gender-Based Stereotypes in Discretionary Police Decisions 
This Comment’s equal protection claim takes issue with a specific action 
taken by a particular police officer in response to a call from an individual 
woman.  Having identified that specific action, it challenges the basis on which 
that officer made that decision.  The key question is whether gender, in the 
form of a gender-based stereotype, influenced the decision that officer made in 
response to that victim’s request for help. 
The invocation of gender in this way avoids the disparate impact problem 
faced by previous gender-based equal protection claims because it narrows the 
scope of scrutinized conduct to individual instances of mistreatment of a victim 
by a police officer.  This conception of the claim relies on framing the relevant 
inquiry as whether an officer’s conduct was motivated by the gender of this 
individual victim—and thus motivated by gender per se—rather than 
attempting to impute a classification based on gender via a disparate impact 
argument.  Thus, the plaintiff can directly assert that the classification is 
 
 131 There is a key distinction between this discussion of discretion and the role of discretion in the 
procedural due process line of cases, as discussed by Justice Scalia in the Castle Rock opinion.  In that case, in 
order to show that Ms. Gonzales’s procedural due process rights were violated, it was necessary to show that 
she was entitled to enforcement of her restraining order, and the prerequisite to entitlement was a lack of police 
discretion.  Therefore, she could not make a successful claim unless the mandatory arrest statute eliminated 
any and all police discretion, an argument that Justice Scalia rejected.  For this type of equal protection 
challenge, in which only an officer’s use of gender stereotyping is at issue, there is no need to eliminate 
discretion entirely; the only requirement is that the discretion be exercised for an appropriate reason, and not 
on the basis of an impermissible, unconstitutional stereotype.  This claim does not invalidate discretion; it 
simply challenges how the police use their discretion.  Therefore, this strategy is more moderate than both a 
procedural due process-based claim and a state tort remedy, each of which is premised on violation of a 
mandatory arrest statute.  See supra text accompanying notes 50–59 and 61–62.  In fact, this equal protection 
claim does not require states to have enacted mandatory arrest statutes at all, because it does not question 
officers’ actual ability to exercise their discretion—it simply requires them to do so on an appropriate basis. 
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gender and therefore have her claim reviewed with intermediate scrutiny.  This 
strategy relies on challenging the constitutionality of state use of gender-based 
stereotypes and invokes the Court’s jurisprudence rejecting outdated but 
invidious stereotypes about women. 
a. Gender-Based Stereotypes and the Law 
Gender stereotypes are “archaic and overbroad generalizations about 
gender.”132  It is firmly established within equal protection jurisprudence that 
state actors may not employ gender-based stereotypes in making decisions 
about how to treat men and women.  In J. E. B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B., the 
Court held as “axiomatic” that “discrimination on the basis of gender by state 
actors violates the Equal Protection Clause, particularly where . . . the 
discrimination serves to ratify and perpetuate invidious, ‘archaic, and 
overbroad’ stereotypes about . . . men and women.”133  Through its decisions in 
cases such as J. E. B.,134 Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,135 and 
United States v. Virginia (VMI),136 the Court has made clear that gender-based 
stereotypes, which make assumptions about members of either gender, will 
violate the Equal Protection Clause.  The majority in Hogan emphasized that 
states may not “rel[y] upon the simplistic, outdated assumption that gender 
[can] be used as a ‘proxy for other, more germane bases of classification.’”137 
In VMI, the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) defended its policy of 
denying admission to all women by arguing that its educational mission 
depended on the use of the adversative method of educating students, and that 
this method could not accommodate women.138  VMI defended its position 
through expert testimony stating that men and women have different 
“tendencies” and “gender-based developmental differences.”139  One expert for 
VMI stated that “‘[m]ales tend to need an atmosphere of adversativeness,’ 
while ‘[f]emales tend to thrive in a cooperative atmosphere.’”140  However, the 
 
 132 J. E. B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B., 511 U.S. 127, 135 (1994) (quoting Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 
498, 508 (1975)). 
 133 Id. at 130–31.  In Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, the Court stated that “[a]lthough the test 
for determining the validity of a gender-based classification is straightforward, it must be applied free of fixed 
notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and females.”  458 U.S. 718, 724–25 (1982). 
 134 511 U.S. at 139–40. 
 135 458 U.S. at 725, 730. 
 136 518 U.S. 515, 541–42 (1996). 
 137 458 U.S. at 726 (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976)). 
 138 518 U.S. at 540. 
 139 Id. at 541 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1434 (W.D. Va. 1991)). 
 140 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Virginia, 766 F. Supp. at 1434) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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expert—and VMI—conceded that some women were capable of meeting the 
requirements of a typical male student at VMI and indeed would do well under 
the adversative model.141 
The Supreme Court rejected VMI’s arguments and held that this use of 
gender stereotypes—to make assumptions about the particular characteristics 
of an individual female candidate—was a classification based on gender that 
lacked the requisite exceedingly persuasive justification and was therefore an 
unconstitutional violation of equal protection.142  The majority stated that 
“equal protection principles, as applied to gender classifications, mean state 
actors may not rely on ‘overbroad’ generalizations to make ‘judgments about 
people that are likely to . . . perpetuate historical patterns of 
discrimination.’”143  Moreover, the Court emphasized that “generalizations 
about ‘the way women are,’ estimates of what is appropriate for most women, 
no longer justify” dissimilar treatment of men and women.144  Thus, in VMI, 
the Court rejected VMI’s use of gender stereotypes to generalize about the 
nature and tendencies of all women and disapproved the use of those 
stereotypes to impute characteristics to individual women.145 
 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. at 540. 
 143 Id. at 541–42 (alteration in original) (quoting and citing J. E. B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B., 511 U.S. 127, 
139 n.11 (1994)). 
 144 Id. at 550. 
 145 Two other important cases in the Court’s gender-based stereotyping jurisprudence, mentioned above, 
are Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan and J. E. B. ex rel. T. B. v. Alabama.  In Hogan, a state-run 
university restricted admission to its nursing program to women.  458 U.S. 718, 720 (1982).  A male applicant 
challenged the policy under equal protection law.  Id. at 721.  Mississippi argued that the admission policy was 
an instance of educational affirmative action.  Id. at 727.  The Court rejected this argument, holding, inter alia, 
that the State “failed to establish that the alleged objective is the actual purpose underlying the discriminatory 
classification.”  Id. at 730.  Instead, the majority stated that the policy of excluding males from the nursing 
program “tends to perpetuate the stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively woman’s job.”  Id. at 729.  In 
J. E. B., the defendant in a paternity suit challenged on equal protection grounds the government’s use of its 
peremptory strikes to empanel an all-female jury.  511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994).  He argued that the exclusion of 
men from the jury on the basis of their gender violated equal protection principles.  Id.  The government 
defended its use of gender-based peremptory strikes by arguing that men and women have different attitudes 
and that women would be more sympathetic to a paternity suit and more likely to find in favor of paternity.  Id. 
at 137–38.  The government contended that its interest was establishing the paternity of a child born out of 
wedlock, which justified the use of the gender-based discrimination.  Id. at 137 n.8.  The Court rejected both 
the interest advanced by the government and the proffered justification.  Id. at 137–38.  Discussing the actual 
interest of the state, the Court stated, “What respondent fails to recognize is that the only legitimate interest it 
could possibly have in the exercise of its peremptory challenges is securing a fair and impartial jury.”  Id. at 
137 n.8.  Holding that the classification did not substantially relate to advancing the state’s interest under 
intermediate scrutiny, the Court stated it would “not accept as a defense to gender-based peremptory 
challenges ‘the very stereotype the law condemns.’”  Id. at 138 (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 
(1991)).  The Court further noted: 
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With this jurisprudence in mind, the following part develops a claim based 
on the VMI Court’s principles and reasoning in the context of a police officer’s 
failure to respond to a gender-based violence victim’s request for the 
enforcement of her restraining order.  The argument uncovers the use of 
gendered stereotypes by police officers in their responses to past plaintiff-
victims.  While many stereotypes may arise in the litigation of a particular 
case, the discussion here is limited to two examples that serve to illustrate the 
argument: women should be submissive to their husbands, and women are 
hysterical. 
b. Gender-Based Stereotypes and Police Discretion in Domestic Violence 
Arrests 
A compelling gender-stereotyping claim can be made in the context of a 
gender-based violence victim whose pleas for help are ignored by the police.  
The focus of this claim is on the discretion exercised by police officers when 
they respond to an individual victim’s call.  In exercising their discretion about 
whether and how to respond, officers must base their decisions on the facts of 
the particular case, or another legitimate and appropriate basis.  The argument, 
stated simply, is that police officers may not make inferences about the 
specifics of an individual woman’s case based on gender stereotypes. 
For example, when Jena Balistreri called the police because her estranged 
husband, against whom she had a restraining order, was attacking her, the 
officer who arrived at the scene declined to arrest Ms. Balistreri’s husband 
because the officer “did not blame plaintiff’s husband for hitting her, because 
of the way she was ‘carrying on.’”146  The decision not to arrest Mr. Balistreri 
was a discretional one because the officer had probable cause to arrest but 
chose not to do so.147  The reason he did not arrest Mr. Balistreri was that he 
 
Respondent offers virtually no support for the conclusion that gender alone is an accurate 
predictor of juror’s attitudes; yet it urges this Court to condone the same stereotypes that justified 
the wholesale exclusion of women from juries and the ballot box. . . .  We have made abundantly 
clear in past cases that gender classifications that rest on impermissible stereotypes violate the 
Equal Protection Clause. 
Id. at 138–39, 139 n.11.  These cases, as well as VMI, demonstrate the Court’s commitment to eradicating the 
use of gendered stereotypes under equal protection jurisprudence. 
 146 Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 855 F.2d 1421, 1427 (9th Cir. 1988), superseded by 901 F.2d 969 
(9th Cir. 1990). 
 147 The officer’s own statement shows that he believed Ms. Balistreri when she told him that she had been 
attacked by her husband.  Furthermore, the facts of the case provide sufficient evidence that Mr. Balistreri was 
in violation of his restraining order.  Id. at 1423, 1426. 
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felt Ms. Balistreri deserved the violence she suffered because of her own 
actions. 
This line of reasoning relies on the first gender-based stereotype identified 
by this Comment: she deserved it because she should have been more 
submissive.  The officer depends on stereotypes about women for his notions 
of the characteristics that women should have—they should be silent, they 
should not complain, or they should be submissive to their husbands.  In 
addition, the officer invokes a gendered stereotype about what Ms. Balistreri 
actually did to “deserve” the beating—the officer assumes, based on a 
stereotype, that women who are victims of partner abuse do something to 
provoke or incite the abuse.  This officer ignored the reality of Ms. Balistreri’s 
situation—that she was injured by her ex-husband on several occasions, in 
violation of a court-issued restraining order.148  His decision not to arrest Mr. 
Balistreri was a discretionary one motivated by his assumptions about women, 
understood through his gendered stereotypes.  His conduct violated Ms. 
Balistreri’s right to equal protection of the law, free from discriminatory 
governmental action in enforcement of the law.149 
A second gender stereotype that would be improper, if employed by a 
police officer in his discretionary decisions, is the stereotype of the hysterical 
woman.  For example, after she realized her children were missing, Jessica 
Gonzales called the police several times.150  The second time she called, two 
officers were sent to her house, but they said they could not help her because 
the children were with their father, despite the fact that she showed them her 
restraining order, which protected Ms. Gonzales as well as her three 
daughters.151  When she called again after speaking with Mr. Gonzales on the 
phone and discovering his whereabouts, she again requested that the police 
take steps to recover her children.152  Upon hearing that the children were in 
fact with their father, at an amusement park two counties away, 
Dispatcher Cindy Dieck entered into the computer that Jessica 
Gonzales’ children “had been found,” even though Jessica Gonzales 
had specifically informed Ms. Dieck about her restraining order 
against Mr. Gonzales. . . .  In fact, when Jessica Gonzales called 
again at around 10 p.m. to state that Mr. Gonzales had still not 
 
 148 Id. at 1423. 
 149 Id. at 1427. 
 150 Gonzales Brief, supra note 2, at 10–15. 
 151 Id. at 12. 
 152 Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 753 (2005). 
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returned with her children . . . .  Ms. Dieck . . . went on to scold 
Jessica Gonzales, stating that it was “a little ridiculous making us 
freak out and thinking the kids are gone.”153 
Here, something other than a thorough understanding of the situation prompted 
the dispatcher’s belief that Ms. Gonzales’s concern was an overreaction and a 
“ridiculous” reason to report the children as missing.  Given Mr. Gonzales’s 
history of erratic behavior and multiple run-ins with the police in the recent 
past, the dispatcher could not have exercised her discretion based on the facts 
at hand; rather, her reaction must have been based on some other assumption 
about Ms. Gonzales or her situation.154 
Ms. Gonzales’s persistence in trying to persuade the police to enforce her 
restraining order resulted in a response from the dispatcher that reflected a 
gendered stereotype: women are hysterical.  Despite information that Mr. 
Gonzales had removed the children from their home without their mother’s 
knowledge or permission, had taken them to an amusement park two counties 
away in violation of a restraining order, and had not returned them by 10:00 
p.m., the dispatcher still determined that Ms. Gonzales’s situation did not 
qualify as an emergency.  The only way the dispatcher could have reached that 
conclusion is if she thought that Ms. Gonzales was exaggerating, overreacting, 
or otherwise misrepresenting the situation.  Because the dispatcher either did 
not have full knowledge about the Gonzales’ situation, or chose to ignore it, 
and because the dispatcher did not determine that Ms. Gonzales’s request was 
a non-emergency in light of another, more urgent situation to which her 
attention was necessary,155 she must have made this decision based on some 
assumption she made about Ms. Gonzales.  Here, that assumption was that Ms. 
Gonzales was overreacting: despite Ms. Gonzales’s frightened and urgent 
requests, the dispatcher decided that her pleas were not so serious as to merit 
emergency status.  This decision indicates that the dispatcher felt Ms. Gonzales 
was not accurate in her own determination of the danger at hand.  This 
assumption—that Ms. Gonzales was irrational and hysterical—resulted in the 
dispatcher’s discretionary decision not to respond to Ms. Gonzales’s request 
with any action. 
 
 153 Gonzales Brief, supra note 2, at 24 (footnotes omitted). 
 154 Id. at 9. 
 155 See supra note 11 for an instance in which the officer had neither a factual basis for ignoring Ms. 
Gonzales’s request, nor another task to which he needed to attend; he simply declined to assist her and went to 
dinner instead. 
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The preceding examples demonstrate instances in which police officers 
relied on gendered stereotypes to make discretionary decisions.  These are 
simply two illustrations; there are many other gendered stereotypes that are 
invoked frequently in this context.156  Each time a woman calls about her 
husband or boyfriend violating his restraining order and a police officer 
declines to respond to her requests because he thinks the victim is lying, 
calling repeatedly to get attention, or complaining to the police because she is 
vindictive, the officer has engaged in gender stereotyping.  Each of these 
thought processes, when it results in a decision not to respond or not to arrest, 
is an inappropriate exercise of discretion.  Unless the officer had another 
reason for deciding against assisting the victim, his inappropriate basis for 
exercising discretion is actionable under the Equal Protection Clause.157  Thus, 
if police decisions and actions are motivated by assumptions that rely on 
gender stereotypes, then they will have violated the constitutional rights of the 
victim. 
Despite the many examples of inappropriate exercises of police discretion 
discussed above, it is important to reiterate that this argument does not 
advocate an elimination of police discretion entirely.  Unlike mandatory arrest 
statutes, which attempt to force a reluctant police officer to arrest—in every 
instance—an abuser in violation of a restraining order, this equal protection 
argument leaves room for officers to exercise their discretion—as long as they 
do so in an appropriate manner.  Indeed, the litigation theory presented by this 
Comment does not rely on mandatory arrest provisions at all; even if an officer 
is not required to arrest someone who violated a restraining order, he must not 
decide whether to do so based on gendered stereotypes.158 
 
 156 See, e.g., Emily C. Rutledge, Comment, Healing Jurisprudential “Bruises”: A Critique of the Failure 
of Due Process to Account for the Intersection of Race, Class, and Gender in the Post-Castle Rock Era, 53 
HOW. L.J. 421, 434–35 (2010) (discussing a variety of stereotypes that police hold about battered women 
generally, and poor, minority victims in particular). 
 157 It is important to note here that gendered stereotypes are not appropriate even if they are true of most 
women.  See supra note 141; J. E. B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B., 511 U.S. 127, 139 n.11 (1994) (“We have made 
abundantly clear in past cases that gender classifications that rest on impermissible stereotypes violate the 
Equal Protection Clause, even when some statistical support can be conjured up for the generalization.”).  
Even if many women are hysterical, or do exaggerate the dangerousness of their situations, and even if the 
officer has personally experienced this, it would still be unconstitutional for that stereotype to influence the 
treatment given to an individual woman.  Obviously, there are examples of women who do not fit the 
stereotype, such as Jessica Gonzales, whose fear and panic were well-founded.  Treating her based on the 
stereotype both was unconstitutional and resulted in horrific but avoidable consequences. 
 158 By promoting police responsiveness to gender-based violence victims without advocating for, or 
relying on, mandatory arrest provisions, this argument avoids the many feminist criticisms of mandatory arrest 
laws.  See, e.g., Leigh Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism: An Anti-Essentialist Critique of Mandatory 
JAIN GALLEYSFINAL 6/28/2011  8:36 AM 
2011] ENGENDERING FAIRNESS IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ARRESTS 1043 
This argument recognizes that there are plenty of well-trained, careful 
police officers who strive to do the right thing and whose decisions are not 
motivated by outdated, gendered stereotypes.  These officers need not be afraid 
of frivolous claims against them.  Discretion is fine, as long as it is not 
motivated by gendered stereotypes that reflect an unwillingness to take women 
seriously and a lack of concern for their safety, which ultimately lead to brutal 
and tragic consequences. 
B. The Government Interest: Applying the Intermediate Scrutiny Test 
As discussed above, classifications made based on gender are subject to 
intermediate scrutiny and are constitutional only if use of the classification 
substantially relates to achieving an important government interest.  For the 
argument advanced by this Comment, a key determinant of the plaintiff’s 
likelihood of success will be the way in which a court characterizes the 
government interest at stake.159  Moreover, the breadth of the characterization 
of the government interest will affect both whether it is considered “important” 
and how related the classification is to achieving the interest.  If a court 
construes the government interest as the narrow ability of police officers to 
exercise their discretion on whatever basis they wish, then a plaintiff will likely 
be able to win her claim.  If, on the other hand, the court characterizes the 
government interest so broadly that it considers at stake the ability of the police 
to do their job without a lawsuit at every step, then the victim will likely lose. 
For these reasons, it is important to understand the various ways in which a 
defendant, and a court, could characterize the relevant government interest, as 
well as the effect each characterization would have on the subsequent equal 
protection analysis.  The next part of this Comment considers several ways the 
government interest could be framed and asks two questions: is the 
 
Interventions in Domestic Violence Cases, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (2009); G. Kristian Miccio, A House 
Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and the Conservatization of the Battered Women’s Movement, 
42 HOUS. L. REV. 237 (2005). 
 159 See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak Its 
Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1900 (2004) (noting that in Bowers v. Hardwick, which involved a statute 
banning any act of sodomy, “the Supreme Court went out of its way to recast the plaintiff’s claim to 
substantive protection under the Due Process Clause for [the plaintiff’s] private sexual relationships as an 
asserted ‘fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy’” (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986))); 
supra note 141 (describing the J. E. B. Court’s rejection of the government’s argument for the use of 
peremptory strikes based on gender and the majority’s subsequent reinterpretation of the actual interest at 
stake). 
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government interest important, and is the gender-based classification 
substantially related to that interest?160 
1. Interpretation Number One: The Interest in Discrimination 
At its narrowest, the government interest could be described as the ability 
of the police to discriminate against individuals based on gender.  In other 
words, the only government interest at stake would be the police’s ability to 
provide inferior protection to gender-based violence victims with impunity.  
Viewed in this way, the state interest is certainly not important—and likely not 
even legitimate—so it would fail intermediate scrutiny and even rational basis 
review.  This is arguably the correct way to view the government interest, 
because the only action proscribed by the equal protection claim is gender 
stereotyping—all the officers must do to avoid liability is premise their 
discretion on a constitutional reason rather than an unconstitutional stereotype 
about women.  In other words, the plaintiff’s argument here is that gender 
stereotyping can serve no other purpose than discriminating against women.  
However, it is unlikely that the Court would accept such a narrow 
characterization of the interest at stake, and defendant police officers and 
police departments will advance arguments that the interest at stake is broader 
and more significant. 
2. Interpretation Number Two: The Interest in Allocation of Time and 
Resources 
A second, more moderate way of construing the government interest at 
stake here is as the ability of the police to exercise their discretion in terms of 
how to allocate limited time, staff, and resources.  As emphasized by Justice 
Scalia in the majority opinion in Castle Rock, the Court recognizes police 
discretion as a historically grounded—and likely important—interest.161  Thus, 
if the reviewing court frames the government interest in this way, the key 
question will become whether the use of gender stereotypes substantially 
relates to this interest. 
 
 160 In addition to demonstrating that the classification substantially relates to achieving the government 
interest, the government must also show that the interest advanced during litigation is the actual purpose 
behind the classification, not a post hoc justification.  United States v. Virginia (VMI), 518 U.S. 515, 535–36 
(1996) (“[A] tenable justification must describe actual state purposes, not rationalizations for actions in fact 
differently grounded.”). 
 161 See supra text accompanying notes 53–57; see also supra note 131. 
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Even if the government interest is construed in this way, a police officer 
can still make discretionary decisions without violating the Equal Protection 
Clause.  For example, if a police officer chose not to respond to a violence 
victim’s call because another, more urgent matter prevented the officer from 
responding at that time, then the plaintiff will not have an actionable claim.  
The police officer’s actions did not violate equal protection because the basis 
on which he acted was not a gendered stereotype, and therefore not 
problematic.  If he chose not to respond to a victim’s call because he needed to 
respond to another situation, he acted on the basis of other facts that created a 
more pressing need.  In this situation, he likely did not invoke any gendered 
stereotype at all, and at the very least, the stereotypes did not result in 
treatment that violated the principles of equal protection because they were not 
the basis on which the officer exercised his discretion.162  Alternatively, if he 
chose not to respond because he had specific facts or knowledge that the victim 
was not in danger, or because he thought another officer was already 
responding to the situation, here again the officer would not be exposed to 
liability because his exercise of discretion was based on something other than a 
stereotype. 
In contrast, police discretion exercised on the basis of gendered stereotypes 
will fail the balancing test because the use of stereotypes is not substantially 
related to preserving police resources.  In other words, gender stereotyping will 
never substantially relate to the interest of effectively distributing limited 
resources because effective distribution of resources requires knowledge of 
facts that are specific to the situation at hand, rather than reliance on 
stereotypes about women generally.  Since the Supreme Court has rejected the 
use of gendered stereotypes as an unacceptable justification for institutional 
decisions, it is likely that a court would find that the use of stereotypes in this 
context is not substantially related to preserving police resources. 
 
 162 A simple failure to respond or protect, without any allegation of dissimilar treatment of similarly 
situated persons, does not violate equal protection.  This is because individual citizens hold no absolute right to 
police protection.  See supra text accompanying notes 33 and 43–44.  Equal protection simply ensures a 
citizen’s right to be protected equally to others that are similarly situated; that is, police may decline to protect 
everyone, or they may provide poor responses across the board.  In this situation, there is no allegation of 
inappropriate classifications on the basis of a suspect or quasi-suspect class and, thus, no equal protection 
claim. 
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3. Interpretation Number Three: The Broadest Government Interest 
However, if sued, police officers will likely argue that the government 
interest at stake is much broader and more serious than a simple question of 
discretion and resources.  They will claim it goes to the ability of the police to 
do their jobs and therefore define the government interest at stake as the 
freedom to make necessary discretionary decisions without constant exposure 
to liability.163 
To counter this policy argument, the plaintiff should contend that while 
discretion is an important government interest, the equal protection claim 
developed here would affect police discretion and exposure to liability in a 
very narrow and minor way.  First, discretion would be limited only to the 
extent that an officer employs gender stereotypes.  Given the extent to which 
this claim hinges on police use of gender stereotypes—and nothing else related 
to discretion—only those officers who employed gendered stereotypes would 
risk exposure to liability.  The plaintiff would still have to convince the court 
that this was indeed the basis on which the officer decided to act.  Thus, only 
those plaintiffs with some evidence that an officer treated her dissimilarly on 
the basis of a gender stereotype would have a credible claim.  Furthermore, the 
additional exposure to liability created by this action would be quite small.  
Police officers already face the threat of § 1983 liability for violations of all 
other constitutional rights of a victim, so this additional avenue for liability 
represents only a marginal increase in the risk of liability they already face.  
Thus, the government interest at stake is narrower than it may appear at first 
blush. 
Nevertheless, it is possible that a court would accept police arguments and 
characterize the government interest so broadly that it would be nearly 
impossible for a plaintiff to win.  For example, the court could determine that 
the government interest at stake is the ability of police to do their job without 
being sued for every decision they make, which would effectively paralyze the 
police to inaction.  Most broadly interpreted, the government interest here 
would amount to absolute police discretion and freedom from liability for all 
discretionary decisions.  Based on the Court’s approach in DeShaney and 
Castle Rock, if the government interest is framed in this way, the plaintiff will 
be fighting an uphill battle to show a court that any classification would not 
 
 163 Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 11–12, Town of Castle Rock v. 
Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 751 (2005) (No. 04-278). 
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substantially relate to achieving such an important interest.  In this scenario, a 
plaintiff would almost never win. 
Even with such a broad government interest at stake, however, it is possible 
that a plaintiff-victim could successfully argue that the government action here 
did indeed violate equal protection.  The key for the plaintiff is to convince a 
court that the invocation of gender stereotypes does not substantially relate to 
achieving any government interest due to the inaccuracy of these stereotypes 
and the gravity of the risk posed when the stereotype is false and the victim is 
in real danger.  As discussed in the second interpretation above, police liability 
is implicated only if officers employ gender stereotypes.  This is a plaintiff’s 
most salient point at this juncture, as she would need to make clear that holding 
a police officer liable for his use of gender-based stereotypes would not inhibit 
his ability to do anything legitimately related to his job. 
While these interpretations are based on three distinct ways of framing the 
government interest, the range of interests is actually a spectrum.  Both 
plaintiff and government positions will inevitably include arguments from each 
interpretation.  Ultimately, a crucial determinant of the success of the argument 
developed by this Comment will be the way in which its various pieces—the 
classification, the government interest, the relationship between the two—are 
framed by litigants and interpreted by courts. 
CONCLUSION 
In the context of the enforcement of restraining orders for gender-based 
violence victims, this Comment contributes to addressing the current state of 
police unresponsiveness and unaccountability by shifting the question 
presented to a court.  Rather than asking the court to infer from an individual 
victim’s experience a policy or practice that affects all female victims similarly 
situated, this Comment’s equal protection argument narrows the lens and 
instead challenges police treatment of an individual victim.  In doing so, it 
draws on the reasoning of well-established equal protection jurisprudence 
rejecting the use of gender stereotypes. 
Although the exact argument of an individual gender-based violence victim 
will depend on the facts of her case, the model for an equal protection claim 
that challenges gender stereotypes in the context of intimate relationships 
provides a ready and useful template for male victims of intimate partner 
violence as well as individuals in abusive same-sex relationships.  Empirically, 
police officers are highly unresponsive to male victims of intimate partner 
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violence, whether they are in a heterosexual or same-sex relationship.164  A 
police officer’s hostile response is likely, at least in part, a result of the 
assumptions an officer might make about a man asking the police to protect 
him from a domestic partner—male or female.165  Furthermore, poor police 
response to lesbians abused by their partners166 is likely caused by the 
stereotypes that come into play when an individual calls for protection from 
violence perpetrated by a woman.167  Thus, the rejection of gendered 
stereotypes in the context of gender-based violence could—in addition to 
creating police accountability where none currently exists—have the added 
effect of increasing the visibility of non-traditional domestic violence.168 
Finally, while relying on well-established principles, the application of this 
reasoning in the context of gender-based violence situations contributes to 
feminist legal scholarship by rejecting stereotypes in the “domestic” context—
an important development since up until now, these stereotypes have been 
rejected in the workplace169 and in education,170 but have remained steadfast in 
the domestic sphere.171 
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 164 See, e.g., Carla M. da Luz, A Legal and Social Comparison of Heterosexual and Same-Sex Domestic 
Violence: Similar Inadequacies in Legal Recognition and Response, 4 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 251 
(1994). 
 165 See, e.g., Sheila M. Seelau & Eric P. Seelau, Gender-Role Stereotypes and Perceptions of 
Heterosexual, Gay and Lesbian Domestic Violence, 20 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 363 (2005). 
 166 See, e.g., da Luz, supra note 164. 
 167 See, e.g., Seelau & Seelau, supra note 165. 
 168 The invisibility of same sex partner violence is not simply a problem among police officers.  Legal 
academics have long ignored the issue and little has been written about it.  See Kathleen Finley Duthu, Why 
Doesn’t Anyone Talk About Gay and Lesbian Domestic Violence?, 18 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 23, 24 (1996). 
 169 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).  While Hopkins was a Title VII case, rather than 
an equal protection case, the majority made clear that gender stereotypes have no place in the workplace.  Id. 
at 251 (“As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day when an employer could 
evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their group, for 
‘“[i]n forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to 
strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.”’  An 
employer who objects to aggressiveness in women but whose positions require this trait places women in an 
intolerable and impermissible catch 22: out of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if they do 
not.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 
702, 707 n.13 (1978))). 
 170 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia (VMI), 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 
U.S. 718 (1984). 
 171 See, e.g., Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Struck by Stereotype: Ruth Bader Ginsburg on Pregnancy 
Discrimination as Sex Discrimination, 59 DUKE L.J. 771, 778–83 (2010). 
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